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THE LIMITS OF HIGH TREES
Lord Denning: The Judge and the Law. By J.L. Jowell and J.B.W.B.
McAuslan, eds. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984.
Reviewed by Reuben Hasson.*
I opened this book with some misgivings. Too much has been written
in the Commonwealth about the judiciary, especially Lord Denning, to
the neglect of other law-making bodies, both formal and informal. By
the time I had finished the book, however, I was convinced that the
enterprise had been worthwhile. Seven of the ten essays - those on
substantive areas of the law - range from good to superb. The others
are disappointing.
I. THE GENERAL ESSAYS
These three disappointing essays attempt to write about Denning
in the round. This may be beyond any legal scholar bound by the format
of a single essay. Thus, Professor Heuston, writing about the life and
times of Denning, paints an incredible picture of the 1930s when Denning
was at the Bar. In those days, we are told, "civil liberties, demonstrations,
police harassment, racial and sex discrimination, one-parent families, legal
action groups, [and] neighbourhood law centres" were unknown.1 Yet
Professor Heuston, an accomplished constitutional scholar, cannot be
unaware of the Black Shirt movement, the Public OrderAct,2 the Incitement
to Disaffection Act,3 and the police harassment of the Unemployed
Workers' Movement. Perhaps he is suggesting that Denning was unaware
of all this, but even this seems unlikely. Later, Professor Heuston writes
of the picket at Blackwell's bookshop in 1980 when Denning was supposed
to have signed copies of his book The Due Process of Law.4
Heuston also points out that MPs and even a section of the Press
had begun to criticise Denning.5 He makes it appear that these attacks
@ Copyright, 1986, Reuben Hasson.
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
R.F.V. Heuston, "Lord Denning- The Man and His Times" in J.L. Jowell & J.P.W.B. McAuslan,
eds, Lord Denning: The Judge and the Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984) 1 at 9 [hereinafter
The Judge].
2 Public Order Ac 1936 (U.K.), 1 Edw. 8 & I Geo. 6, c. 6.
3 Incitement to Disaffection Ac 1934 (U.K.), c. 56.
4 See Heuston, supra, note 1 at 17.
5 Ibid.
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were 'bolts from the blue'. Leaving aside such trifles as his attack on
the welfare state when he was awarded an honorary doctorate at the
University of Western Ontario, one cannot blame people for getting very
angry when they read that
[i]n recent times England has been invaded - not by enemies - not by friends
- but by those who seek England as a haven. In England there is social security
- a national health service and guaranteed housing - all to be had for the asking
without payment and without working for it. Once here, each seeks to bring his
relatives to join him. So they multiply exceedingly ....6
One cannot write like a Monday Club member and evade the ensuing
anger. In fact, Denning was treated sympathetically for his final indis-
cretion - the allegation that those accused of riots in Bristol had been
acquitted because the jury contained some blacks. 7
The most disappointing essay in the book is by Professor A.W.B.
Simpson, who omits to write about Lord Denning at all. He doubts whether
we will ever again have any great jurists like Paul, Ulpian, Coke, and
Blackburn, for "[t]here seems today to be no field of private law which
is regarded as immune from departmental and legislative interfer-
ence... ."8 So, only private lawyers can be great jurists. This means
thatjudges of the calibre of Atkin, Wright, and Wilberforce (to say nothing
of Brandeis and Black in the United States) must be regarded as second
rate since most of their work involved the construction of statutes. The
notion that one has to be a private lawyer to be a great jurist tells us
a great deal about Professor Simpson's legal education and attitudes and
little else. Professor Simpson ends with an attack on Douglas Hay's essay
in Albion's Fatal Tree,9 which is described as a "cult book,"10 and John
Griffith's Politics of the Judiciary."' Since it is impossible to do justice
to these books in two pages, one wonders what Simpson is up to. My
guess is that he feels anger at two of the books that have questioned
the status of the "great jurist." But if Professor Simpson will not, or
cannot, tell us whether Denning was a great jurist, Professor Waddams,
giving a "Commonwealth perspective," is prepared to put Denning ahead
of Paul, Ulpian, Coke, and all comers. In an outrageous passage, he
compares Denning to Newton: "To say that Lord Denning has influenced
6 C. Palley, "Lord Denning and Human Rights - Reassertion of the Right to Justice" in The
Judge, supra, note 1, 251 at 303.
7 See Heuston, supra, note 1 at 17.
8 A.W.B. Simpson, "Lord Denning as Jurist" in The Judge, supra, note 1, 441 at 444.
9 D. Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law" in D. Hay et aL, Albion's Fatal Tree
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1975) 17.
10 Ibid at 452.
11 J.A.G. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, 3rd ed. (London: Fontana Press, 1985).
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the law of contracts is rather like saying that the study of physics owes
something to Newton." 12 Waddams seeks to prove Denning's greatness
by listing a whole group of cases on contracts, but he fails to explain
how any one of these cases has been of dramatic importance to the
common law. (I think that most of the cases that Waddams cites are
either socially harmful or else add little to our jurisprudence: Professor
Atiyah demonstrates this in his essay.)
II. THE SPECIFIC ESSAYS
Professor Atiyah, writing of Denning's contributions to the law of
contract and tort, keeps his feet on the ground. I cannot, however, agree
with Atiyah's statement that Denning has almost always distinguished
between commercial and consumer contracts.13 This may have been true
until 1969, but after Harbutt's Plasticine Ltd v. Wayne Tank & Pump
Co.,14 Photo Production Ltdv. Securicor Transport Ltd'5 and George Mitchell
(Chesterhall) Ltd v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd,16 this statement is no longer
tenable. Again I disagree when Atiyah adds that "where he has departed
from this approach, it will often be found that his views accord closer
with those of the mercantile community than do those of his colleagues."'17
I did not hear any cheering by the business community. I suspect that
Professor Atiyah did not hear any cheering either.18
Professor Atiyah writes that where Denning was dealing with
exemption clauses covering consumer goods, he would take note of
insurance. Thus, in Halbauer v. Brighton Corp.,19 Denning concurred in
a decision applying an exemption clause whereby the defendants protected
themselves from liability for theft of a caravan parked on their premises.
Denning felt rightly that the owner should insure. Yet, in Levison v. Patent
Steam Cleaning Co.,20 where the plaintiff consumer had insured a carpet
for £900 and the cleaners had not returned it, Denning was prepared
12 S. Waddams, "Lord Denning: A Commonwealth Perspective" in The Judge, supra, note
1, 455 at 456.
13 P.S. Atiyah, "Contract and Tort" in The Judge, supra, note 1, 29 at 29.
14 (1969), [1970] 1 Q.B. 447, [1970] 2 W.L.R. 198 (C.A.).
15 (1978), [1978] 1 W.L.R. 856, [1978] 3 All E.R. 146 (C.A.), rev'd (1980), [1980] A.C.
827, [1980] 1 All E.R. 556 (H.L.).
16 (1982), [1983] 2 Q.B. 284, [1982] 3 W.L.R. 1036 (C.A.), affd (1982), [1983] 1 W.L.R.
1, [1983] 2 A.C. 803 (H.L.).
17 See Atiyah, supra, note 13 at 29.
18 In these cases, neither the nominal nor the real plaintiffs could have had much cause for
cheering.
19 (1954), [1954] 1 W.L.R 1161, [1954] 2 All E.R. 707 (C.A.).
20 (1977), [1978] Q.B. 69, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 90 (C.A.).
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to allow a subrogated action by the insurer against the cleaning company.
If it is argued that Denning believed that the subrogation action would
deter the careless and the fraudulent, this argument should have prevailed
in Halbauer. One cannot expect complete consistency from any judge,
but some consistency is called for in cases that recur with some frequency.
Of the doctrine in Lloyd's Bank Ltd v. Bundy2' and Shroeder A.
Publishing Co. v. Macaulay,22 Atiyah rightly remarks that "any such
doctrine is unlikely to go far beyond the effect of existing authorities,
as a matter of fact. What is involved in Lord Denning's judgment is
a more open acceptance of what is already largely acknowledged law."23
Atiyah is also correct in being troubled by the fashionably popular decision
in Jarvis v. Swan Tours Ltd.24 Atiyah refers to it as a "casual decision"
and argues that "[i]f ever there was a case in which policy issues needed
to be explored, this was it . ... "25 Atiyah is also rightly critical of two
other Denning decisions in the field of damages - Parsons (H.) (Livestock)
Ltd v. Uttley Ingham & Co.26 and Lazenby Garages Ltd v. Wright.
27
Turning to tort, Atiyah says that "some of Lord Denning's greatest
triumphs are to be found in the modem development of the law of
negligence." 28 Yet nowhere in his judgments and nowhere in his evidence
to the Pearson Commission does Denning indicate whether negligence-
based liability is a good or a bad thing. In Nettleship v. Weston,29 he
seems prepared to jettison negligence liability in favour of some kind
of "risk" liability; but he ignored the writings of some of his brethren
who were prepared to adopt a social insurance approach to the accident
problem.30 Professor Atiyah is correct in concluding that Denning
displayed his greatest strength in this area of obligations despite his
vagaries and inconsistencies. In Atiyah's words, "He has been able to
21 (1974), [1975] Q.B. 326, [1974] 3 W.L.R. 501 (C.A.); but see National Westminster Bank
Pkc. v. Morgan (1985), [1985] 2 W.L.R. 588, [19851 1 All E.R. 82 (H.L.).
22 (1974), [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308, [1974] 3 All E.R. 616 (H.L.).
23 See Atiyah, supra, note 13 at 40.
24 (1972), [1973] Q.B. 233, [1972] 3 W.L.R. 954 (C.A.).
25 See Atiyah, supra, note 13 at 51.
26 (1977), [1978] Q.B. 791, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 990 (C.A.).
27 (1976), [1976] 1 W.L.R 459, [1976] 2 All E.R. 770 (C.A.).
28 See Atiyah, supra, note 13 at 54.
29 (1971), [1971] 2 Q.B. 691, [1971] 3 W.L.R. 370 (C.A.).
30 See, for example, in the United Kingdom, Lord Parker Ci., "Compensation for Accidents
on the Road" (1965) 18 Curr. L. Prob. 1; Lord Kilbrandon, Other People's Law (London: Stevens,
1966); in Canada, Chief Justice McRuer, "The Motor Car and the Law" in A. Linden, ed., Studies
in Canadian Tort Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1968) 303.
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give full rein to his policy orientations without having to contend with
the often different policy orientation of Parliament."31
Professor Michael Freeman contributes a valuable essay on Denning's
work in family law. Instead of delving immediately into the cases, Freeman
begins with a quotation from Denning's 1960 lecture on the equality
of women:32
We ought to remember that there has been one time previously in the history
of the world when women achieved a considerable measure of equality. It was
in the Roman Empire, and it should serve as a warning of the dangers to which
equality may give rise.... This freedom... proved to be disastrous to the Roman
society. Morals decayed. The marital tie became the laxest the Western world
has seen. Bertrand Russell has expressed the position in a sentence: "Women,
who had been virtuous slaves became free and dissolute; divorce became common;
the rich ceased to have children." This decay of morality was indeed one of the
factors in the fall of the Roman Empire. Let us look upon this and take heed.33
Denning took heed of all this, as his decision in Peake v. Automotive
Products Ltd34 shows. In that case, women working in a factory were
allowed to leave at 4:25 p.m. and men at 4:30 p.m. When a man
complained that this was a breach of the Sex Discrimination Act 197535
Denning thought that that statute must be read in light of the principles
of chivalry and courtesy which mankind were expected to give wom-
ankind. In Ministry of Defence v. Jeremiah,36 Denning rejected his chivalry
rationale but defended his decision in Peake on the basis of de minimis.37
Of course, this is using another rubric to justify inequality. Professor
Freeman says that "Sir James Fitzjames Stephen recognized that pro-
tection and submission were correlatives. It may be doubted whether
Lord Denning does."38 In my opinion, Denning does see these as
correlatives, and he is prepared to extend protection to women who are
prepared to accept a degree of submission.
All this is spelt out in one of his decisions on the wife's right to
stay in the matrimonial home. In Guarasz v. Guarasz,39 he made this
clear:.
31 My ignorance in the field of trusts and equity prevents me from commenting on Mr. Hayton's
essay on Lord Denning's contributions in that field. Suffice it to say that it is a well written and
scholarly piece.
32 The Equaity of Women (Liverpool: University of Liverpool Press, 1960) at 3-4. See M.D.A.
Freeman, "Family Matters" in The Judge, supra, note 1, 109 at 110.
33 See Freeman, !bid
34 (1977), [1978] Q.B. 233, [1977] W.L.R_ 853 (C.A.) [hereinafter Peake cited to Q.B.].
35 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (U.K.), 1975, c. 65.
36 (1979), [1980] Q.B. 87, [1979] 3 W.L.R 857, [1980] LC.R 13 (C.A.).
37 Ibid at 25 ("the only sound ground" for Peake was "de minims").
38 See Freeman, supra, note 32 at 114.
39 (1969), [1969] 3 W.L.R. 482, [1969] 3 All E.R. 822 (C.A.).
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Some features of family life are elemental in our society. One is that it is the
husband's duty to provide his wife with a roof over her head and the children
too. So long as the wife behaves herself, she is entitled to remain in the matrimonial
home.... This is a personal right which belongs to her as a wife. It is not a
proprietary right. So long as she had done nothing to forfeit that right the court
will enforce it.40
It is the phrase "so long as she behaves herself' that is chilling. In the
first place, it is language that is designed to stress the unequal status
of the wife in the relationship. It is the language of parent and child
rather than the language used to describe the status of equals. Second,
there is a vagueness about 'behaving oneself'. Usually, this will mean
the absence of an adulterous relationship, but it is, of course, not limited
to that.
A final example of conditioning rights on "good behaviour" is to
be found in cases such as Re L (Infants).41 In that case, Denning reversed
the decision of the trial judge who gave care and control of two small
girls, who were wards of the court, to the mother. She was solely responsible
for the breakdown of the marriage and was committing adultery. Denning
would have none of this. He wrote:
It would be an exceedingly bad example if it were thought that a mother could
go off with another man and then claim as of right to say: "Oh well, they are
my two little girls and I am entitled to take them with me. I can not only leave
my home and break it up and leave their father, but I can take the children with
me and the law will not say me nay." It seems to me that a mother must realize
that if she leaves and breaks up her home in this way she cannot as of right
demand to take the children from the father.
42
All this moralism diverts the judge's mind from what should be the crucial
issue in the case - what is in the best welfare of the children.43
The limitations of Denning's reforms are well brought out in an
incisive passage by Professor Freeman:
His is the sort of reform which improves the position of some women while at
the same time perpetuating the view that domestic labour has no economic value
and rights generally are dependent on moral proprieties. It is as well to remind
ourselves of this for Lord Denning has often been seen, and has seen himself,
as a harbinger of reform. There has been legislative reform to recognize the value
of domestic labour and to preserve maintenance conduct; but these, it must be
stressed, were reforms to reverse trends effectuated by Lord Denning.
4
40 Ibid at 824.
41 (1962), [1962] 1 W.L.R. 886, [1962] 3 All E.R. 1 (C.A.).
42 Ibid at 3-4.
43 See S.(B.D.) v. S.(DJ.) (1975), [1977] 2 W.L.R. 44, [1977] 1 All E.R. 656, [1977] Fain.
109 (C.A.); and Re K (1976), [1977] 2 W.L.R. 33, [19771 1 All E.R. 647, [1977] Fam. 179
(CA.).
44 See Freeman, supra, note 32 at 118.
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In what is, in my view, the best essay in the book, Professor McAuslan
shows how Denning uses his version of "abuse of rights" in the areas
of landlord and tenant, slum clearance, the interpretation of the Housing
(Homeless Persons) Act 1977,45 and other areas in the field of planning
and property law. McAuslan demonstrates in meticulous detail how the
notion of "abuse of rights" (like notions of "good faith" and "un-
conscionability") can be used to achieve almost any object the judge
wishes to achieve. Thus, the idea of "abuse of rights" can be used as
a weapon against, for example, squatters.46 The most bizarre uses that
Denning made of the notion of "abuse of rights" are his decisions under
the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977. The most startling judgment
here must be De Falco v. Crawley District Council.47 The plaintiffs were
held to be intentionally homeless because they voluntarily left Italy where
they had a home and came to England where they did not. Both common
sense and the Code of Guidance, which seemed to give the plaintiffs
a clear right, were ignored. Instead, their claim was defeated by the
unreasonable burden the De Falcos were placing on "true born English-
men."48 Finally, "[T]here were all sorts of benefits to be had whenever
you are unemployed. And best of all they will look after you if you
have nowhere to live."49
Finally, Denning seemed to have little sympathy for tenants living
in poor local authority housing. Thus, in Liverpool City Council v. Irwin,50
despite the admittedly deplorable conditions that Mr. Irwin and his family
lived in, Denning held that the local authority was not in breach of any
contractual or statutory duty to effect repairs. The justification for this
remarkable result was to be found in the fact that
[ilt is remembered too that these tower blocks are occupied by council tenants
at very low rents. They are allowed in practice virtual security of tenure so long
as they pay their rent. If they were to recover damages for the discomfort and
inconvenience they have suffered, the amount of such damages could be offset
against their rents. That does not seem to me to be right, especially when they
are all in a sense responsible for the deplorable state of affairs.51
45 Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 (U.K.), 1977, c. 48.
46 See, most notably, Southwark London Borough Council v. Wiliams (1970), [1971] 2 W.L.R.
467, [1971] 2 All E.R 175 (C.A.); McPhail v. Persons Unknown (1973), [1973] 3 W.L.R. 71,
[1973] All E.R 393 (C.A.); and Metropolitan Police Receiver v. Smith (1974), 118 SJ. 583 (C.A.).
47 (1979), [1980] Q.B. 460, [1980] 2 W.L.R. 664 (C.A.).
48 Ibid at 473.
49 Ibid at 472.
50 (1975), [1976] Q.B. 319, [1975] 3 W.L.R. 663 (CA.).
51 Ibid at 332.
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Writing of Denning's positive use of "abuse of rights" McAuslan
writes:
[Hie played a vital and important role in the transition of land law from a mainly
private law to a mainly public law subject over the last forty years and that even
where his contributions appear now to be discarded, they remain available to be
resurrected in the future by enterprising counsel and unorthodox judges.
50 2
But McAuslan also sees the negative side of Denning's work in this
area:
The picture then that emerges is that of the comfortable, reasonably well-meaning,
country gentleman with not too much understanding of, and, as he grew older,
not too much sympathy, for the problems of urban life outside suburbia. His most
typical judgments concern the countryside; his most censorious, urban poverty.
53
First, while Professor McAuslan's evaluation of Denning's work is
fair, Professor Jowell's review of Denning's contributions in the field
of administrative law is far too generous. Professor Jowell approves of
Denning's liberal view of standing because it provides "a welcome
opportunity to keep executive action in its place and to assert the rule
of law."54 This right of challenge can be asserted by any member of
the public except the proverbial "busybody," or "meddlesome inter-
loper." 55 Second, I do not think that actions like Gourlet can deal with
the non-enforcement or under-enforcement of the law. The idea that
one can improve factory safety, say, by such actions strikes me as being
fanciful. Third, since I do not think that the "rule of law" is an unqualified
good, I am happy to see departures from it on occasion. Thus, when
an amnesty is proclaimed for illegal immigrants who have been in the
country for a period of time, I am happy, and I shed no tears.
Professor Jowell also pays high tribute to Denning's contributions
in the field of natural justice and fair procedure. However, Denning's
record was erratic:
Some cases do exist where he shows uncharacteristic deference to official decisions.
Where national security is involved, he admits this. Immigrants are sometimes
treated less favourably than citizens; but not always. Prisoners and others who
may have forfeited the court's sympathy by past misdeeds are often not afforded
rights of fair hearing eagerly granted to others.
56
52 J.P.W.B. McAuslan, "Land, Planning and Housing" in The Judge, supra, note 1, 161 at
207.
53 Ibid
54 Ibid at 215.
55 Ibid
56 Ibid at 250.
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It can be argued that his brethren did no better, but, unlike Denning,
they did not claim to be "Atkin men,"57 nor did they, through their extra-
judicial writings, profess great concern for civil liberties.5 8
Finally, I am in strong disagreement with Professor Jowell's support
of the decision in the Bromley case.59 In the first place, the notion of
a fiduciary duty owed to ratepayers as opposed to the electorate seems
to me to be ridiculous. Second, the kind of judicial review that Denning
(and Jowell) approve of goes beyond judicial review in any country with
a written Bill of Rights. The Bromley case would strike an American
or Canadian student of the Bill (or Charter) of Rights as startling.60 Jowell
points out that Lord Diplock was prepared to go even further in striking
down local authority decisions, but this hardly qualifies as a defence
for an outrageous decision. Next, Professor Jowell relies on the idea
expressed by Denning in The Changing Law that promises made in a
party manifesto were not sacred. In Denning's words:
Some people vote for [a member] because they approve of some of the proposals
in his party's manifesto, others because they approve of others of the proposals.
Yet others because, while they do not really approve of the proposals, they disapprove
still more of the counter-proposals of the rival party, and so forth. It is impossible
to say therefore that the majority of the people approve of any particular proposal,
let alone of every proposal in the manifesto.
61
I cannot see why what is (or is not) in the manifesto should affect the
legality of a local authority's decision. To be fair, neither could Lord
Denning, for he wrote a few lines later in The Changing Law to the
effect that elected leaders were under a constitutional duty to govern
in the interests of all and not in the interests of their party: "But this
is not a duty which can be enforced by law - the only real check
on their power is the force of public opinion."62
Professor Claire Palley contributes a scholarly essay on Denning
and Human Rights. Professor Palley traces the largely dismal record
from now-forgotten judgments, such as Ross-Clunis v. Papadopoullos,63
57 Professor Heuston quotes Denning as saying after the decision in Liverindge v. Anderson
(1941), [1942] A.C. 206, Atkin's dissent was "after my own heart." Ibid at 5.
58 Denning's professed concerns for individual liberties were stated in a number of books
and articles beginning with Freedom Under the Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1949) and ending
with his Dimbleby lecture, Restraining the Misuse of Power (London: Wildy, 1981).
59 Bromley London Borough Council v. Greater London Council (1981), [1982] 2 W.L.R 62,
[1982] 1 All E.R 129 (C.A.) [hereinafter Bromley cited to W.L.R.I.
60 In my view, a decision such as Bromley goes at least as far as the much criticised decision
in Lochner v. New York (1905), 198 U.S. 45.
61 Sir A. Denning, The Changing Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1953) 9.
62 Ibid at 10.
63 (1958), [1958] 1 W.L.R 546, [1958] 2 All E.R. 23 (P.C.).
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through to better-known cases, such as Soblen,64 Chic Fashions (West
& Wales) Ltd v. Jones,65 Ghani v. Jones,66 and beyond. The most devastating
passage in the essay is to be found in Professor Palley's description of
Denning's attitude towards prisoners' rights:
So far as prisoners were concerned, Denning effectively limited their rights to
protect their reputations by libel actions, limited their rights to civil jury trial,
conferred immunity on their barristers, conferred immunity in suits by them against
police officers who extort, or may have extorted, confessions from them by violence,
refused to uphold even those limited rights to respect for correspondence enjoyed
by them, impeded their rights of access to the European Commission of Human
Rights... denied them the right to legal representation in disciplinary proceedings,
conferred immunity on boards of visitors should they in disciplinary proceedings
wrongfully deny a prisoner remission, and cut down the time and manner within
which the prisoners may sue to challenge administrative decisions affecting them. 67
However, Professor Palley's statement that Denning was "a champion
of freedom of expression" 68 does not square with her own findings:
Again, except in Burmah, Lord Denning did not wish governmental internal decision-
making to be exposed and criticised, a contention substantiated by Lonrho, Harnan
and his sarcasm in Air Canada about "the advocates of open government."
Pharmaceutical companies, casinos, shady business practices and the misbehaviour
of pop stars were the proper topics for investigative journalism, rather than Home
Office administration of prisons, and possible misdeeds by Ministers in breach
of international obligations.
69
This does not seem to be the record one would expect of a "champion
of free speech." Professor Palley states that Denning was a "reformer,
not a redeemer."70 On the evidence that she herself has provided, Denning
was a reactionary at least as often as he was a reformer.
Finally, there is an excellent essay by Messrs. Davies and Friedland
on Denning's contributions in the field of labour law. They document
his increasing intervention into internal union affairs culminating in his
opinion in Cheall v. APEX71 where he was prepared to set aside an
expulsion even though this would violate the Bridlington principles. The
authors then document Denning's more activist role in industrial conflict
beginning first in Stratford (J.T.) & Son, Ltd v. Lindey72 and Torquay
64 R v. Governor of Brixton Prison Ex parte Soblen (1962), [1963] 2 Q.B. 243, [1962] 3
W.L.R. 1154 (C.A.).
65 (1967), [1968] 2 Q.B. 299, [1968] 2 W.L.R. 201 (C.A.).
66 (1969), [1970] 1 Q.B. 693, [1969] 3 W.L.R. 1158 (C.A.).
67 See Palley, supra note 6 at 307.
68 Ibid. at 361.
69 Ibid at 346.
70 Ibid at 366.
71 (1983), [1983] 1 All E.R 1130, [1983] I.C.R. 398 (H.L.).
72 (1964), [1964] 3 W.L.R. 541, [1964] 3 All E.R. 102 (H.L.).
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Hotel Co. v. Cousins.73 In those cases he was still using (although redefining)
existing torts. By the end of his career, he was prepared to use any legal
weapon, including Magna Cara 74 and the European Convention on Human
Rights.75 Some might call this judicial creativity, but it is a good example
of abuse of the judicial process.
Davies and Friedland find that Denning is more sympathetic when
dealing with individual employment cases. Even here, however, he was
not progressive. The authors point out in Richardson v. Koefod,76 a wrongful
dismissal case now only of historical importance, that he uses the words
"trial," "guilty," and "freshly discovered misconduct." They also point
out that he was sympathetic to the Redundancy Payments Act,77 but he
limited the scope of the Act by invoking common law concepts.
I. CONCLUSION
The attempts made over the years to thrust greatness on Lord Denning
fail. From 1970 until his retirement in 1982, I do not think he deserved
even to be called a good judge. On Denning's own admission, his strength
lay in the field of contract and tort; but even in these areas his main
function was to show that policy choices had to be made. Even High
Trees78 will not come to be regarded as a major breakthrough. In my
view, the confusion created by that case will ultimately have to be cleared
up by legislation. But common-law litigation constitutes a minute fraction
of the modem judge's work. In the fields of administrative law, labour
law, social security, and civil liberties, his record can only be termed
- at best - indifferent.
Unlike decisions in cases such as High Trees,79 the decisions in these
areas of the law affect millions of people. I think that it is in these
fields that Denning's quality as a judge has to be decided. In my view,
he fell considerably short of the stature of a great judge (or jurist).
73 (1968), [1969] 2 W.L.R. 289, [1969] 1 All E.R. 522.
74 See EM.A. v. A.C.A.S. (1979), [1979] LC.R 637.
75 See UK Association of Professional Engineers v. A.CAS. (1980), [1981] A.C. 424.
76 (1969), [1969] 1 W.L.R. 1812, [1969] 3 All E.R 1264 (C.A.).
77 Redundancy Payments Act (U.K.), 1965, c. 62.
78 Central London Propeny Trust Lid v. High Trees House Lid (1946), [1946] 1 All E.R. 256,
[1947] K.B. 130 [hereinafter High Trees]. Everyone seems to applaud this decision; the only difficulty
is that nearly everyone places a different interpretation on it.
79 lbid
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